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1 Introduction
Substantial number of elite colleges today in the United States, are admit-
ting students through two-tier admissions programs; early admissions and
regular admissions.2 Since its inception over ﬁfty years ago, various early
admissions plans; ‘early action’, ‘early decision’ and ‘single-choice early ac-
tion’ are adopted by colleges to skim the best students in ‘thinner’ early
admissions markets. Early decision requires that the student promises by
a signed contract to enroll at the program if oﬀered admission, while early
action allows the student the chance to gain an admission decison in the fall
with a non-binding commitment. Single-choice early action program allows
the student to apply to no other early admissions program in the fall.3
Over the years, colleges have frequently changed their admissions plans.
Avery et.al. (2003, p. 97) reports that in 1995-1996, Princeton, Stanford
and Yale adopted early decision plan while Brown, Georgetown and Harvard
had allowed single-choice early applications with a subsequent adoption of
multiple-choice early action program in 1999-2000. Brown quickly switched
to early decision program in 2001-2002, whereas Harvard, Stanford and Yale
made a u-turn to single-choice early action program in 2003-2004.
Institutions that were late in changing their admissions rules accordingly
quickly fell behind in the admissions game frequently played by the elite
colleges. Avery et.al. (2003, p. 298) reports that after the last change by
Stanford, Yale and Harvard in 2003-2004, “prominent Early Action colleges
such as Georgetown, MIT, and the University of Chicago saw their early
applications fall by 15 percent or more. ... Princeton, which did not change
its Early Decision program at all, also suﬀered a decline of 23 percent in early
2According to the NACAC 2005 Early College Application Directory, 384 colleges and
universities offer early application options for students (15 percent of all four-year colleges).
Besides, nearly 70 percent of the 281 private institutions ranked by the U.S. News College
Guide as the “Best National Universities” and the “Best Liberal Arts Colleges” in the
United States offer an early admissions program (Avery et.al., 2003, pp. 1-2).
3Early action and early decision programs are usually on the early November dead-
line with a late December decision timetable. Regular decision offers a later Application
Deadline of January 1, a Common Notification Date usually in early April, and a Common
Reply Date of May 1.
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applications.”
Early admissions programs that have been used very widely and strategi-
cally in the last decade have also started to be openly criticized as complicat-
ing the admissions system, forcing students to act strategically, unleveling the
playing ﬁeld in college admissions and in particular, disfavoring low-income
students.4 Very recently, following Harvard’s remarkable announcement in
2006 to eliminate early admission,5 Princeton and Virginia also announced
that they will terminate their early admissions programs.6 However, some
colleges and universities that oﬀer early action programs argue that it is
not clear how elimination of non-binding early admissions programs such as
early action will result in admission of more low-income students, as recently
voiced by Richard Levin, the President of Yale University.7
Currently, it seems like there exists no consensus over neither the justi-
ﬁcation nor the use of early admissions programs. What is agreeable may
only be that in the near future early admissions programs will remain to be
strategically used by some, if not the majority, of the colleges. Given this
simple conjecture, we aim in this paper to unveil some strategic aspects of
the long-played, yet until now unmodeled, college admissions game. To this
end, we study college admissions problem, introduced by Gale and Shap-
ley (1962) and reformulated by Roth (1985), in a model with early decision
and (multiple-choice) early action and analyze the strategic issues faced by
colleges in the selection of early admissions programs with a focus on the
intertemporal allocation of the total capacities.
Our model considers many-to-one matching problems (markets) involving
two periods: an early admissions period and a regular admissions period.
There are two ﬁnite and disjoint sets of agents, colleges and students. Each
college has a ﬁnite overall capacity that limits the number of students it
can accept in the two periods, and each student can enroll to at most one
4Avery et.al. (2003, p. 137) finds that applying early provides an admission advantage
which is approximately equivalent to 100 additional SAT-1 points. The study also confirms
that the early applicants tend to come from aﬄuent socioeconomic backgrounds, while
students seeking for financial aid postpone their admission to the regular decision period.
5“Harvard to Eliminate Early Admission,” Harvard Gazette, September 14, 2006.
6News@Princeton and UVA Today, November 25, 2006.
7See http://www.yale.edu/opa/president/statements/20060912.html.
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school during the whole matching process. Each college has a preference
relation over the set of groups of students which is responsive to its preference
over the set of students and each student has a preference relation over the
set of colleges and being unmatched. The capacities of colleges together
with the preference proﬁles of colleges and students constitute a matching
environment.
In the early admissions period, each college announces its early admissions
plan, be early decision or (multiple-choice) early action, an early admissions
quota out of its total capacity, an early list of collections of students who
are considered as acceptable in the early admissions period. On the other
side of the market, each student submits an early list of acceptable colleges
in the early admissions period for each possible proﬁle of admissions plans.
A student’s early list at any proﬁle of plans can contain at most one college
that oﬀers early decision. It is also assumed that keeping the early admissions
plans of all colleges except for the plan of a particular college constant, the
set of colleges that a student will apply when this college oﬀers an early
action plan includes the set of colleges that he or she would apply when this
college instead oﬀered an early decision plan.8 Finally, given the early list
of students, hence the early applicant pool of each college, the pre-matching
actions of each college gives the list of the set of rejected, outright deﬀered,
and admissible students in the early admissions period. The admissions plans
and quotas of colleges, the early lists of colleges and students together with
the pre-matching actions of colleges in the early admissions period deﬁne an
early decision market.
An allocation in the early admissions period is a many-to-one early match-
ing where no college is assigned more students than its early decision quota
and no student is assigned more than one college. We assume that any col-
lege defers in the early admissions period, in addition to its outright deﬀered
aplicants, any admissible student with whom it is not matched. Given a
pre-matching early admissions market and a matching in early admissions,
post-matching early admissions status of student determines the status of
8This assumption is statistically in line with the report of Avery et.al. (2003, p. 297)
that when Stanford and Yale switched from early decision to single-choice early action,
early applications they received increased by 70 percent and 56 percent, respectively.
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a student at each college as ‘not applied’, ‘rejected’, ‘ex-post deferred’ or
‘accepted’.
Given a matching realized in the early admissions period, a regular ad-
missions market consists of regular lists of colleges which is a collection of
acceptable students by colleges in regular admissions and regular lists of stu-
dents which is a list of acceptable colleges by a student under his or her
post-matching early admissions status. No student ever applies, in the reg-
ular admissions period, to a college that rejected himself or herself in early
admissions. If a student is accepted to an early decision college in the early
admissions period then he or she does not apply to any colleges in the regular
admissions period. In addition, a student always applies in regular admis-
sions to an early action college that gave ex-post deﬀeral or acceptance as well
as to an early decision college that gave ex-post deferral, provided there ex-
ists no other college that gave early acceptance to this student and is strictly
preferred by the student. Moreover, we assume that the set of colleges a
student applies in regular admissions when he or she was ex-post deﬀered by
a college in early admissions involves all the colleges that he or she would
apply when he or she was accepted early by that college plus a subset of the
acceptable, but less preferred, colleges.
An allocation in the regular admissions period is a many-to-one regular
matching where no college is assigned more students than its overall quota
and no student is assigned more than one college. Notice that regular match-
ing function preserves the early matchings of each college oﬀering early de-
cision plan.
A matching in the early admissions period is stable if no student prefers
remaining unassigned to his or her assignment, no college prefers having a
student slot vacant rather than ﬁlling it with one of its assignments, and
there exists no unmatched college-student pair such that the college prefers
the student to one of its assignments or keeping a vacant slot (if any) and
the student prefers the college to his or her assignment. Stability of a regular
matching in regular admissions is deﬁned similarly.
An early decision matching rule selects a matching for every early decision
market and is stable if it selects a stable matching for every early decision
market.
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A regular decision matching rule selects a matching for every regular
decision market, given any matching in any early decision market. A regular
decision matching rule is stable at an early decision matching rule if it selects
a stable matching for every regular decision market, given any realization of
the early decision matching rule in any early decision market induced by the
associated regular decision market.
An early decision rule and a regular decision rule as an ordered pair form
a matching system. A matching system is stable if it involves a stable early
decision rule at which the regular matching rule in the system is also stable.
Having just described a two-period college admissions market, we are
now ready to consider an admissions game with observable actions, where
the preferences of colleges and students and the total capacity of each col-
lege are common knowledge. The game consists of three consecutive stages:
In the ﬁrst stage, colleges simultaneously choose one of the two early ad-
missions plans, namely early decision and (multiple-choice) early action, to
be implemented in the second stage of the game. Once a proﬁle of plans
is determined, it becomes common knowledge in the rest of the game. In
the second stage, the early admissions market opens. Observing the pro-
ﬁle of early admissions plans and the corresponding preferences of students,
each college simultaneously chooses its early preference list, its early quota,
and the pre-matching partition of its applicant pool. Given the associated
early admissions market, the early matching rule (run by a central clearing-
house) speciﬁes for each college the list of students to accept early within its
early admissions quota. Consequently, the post-matching summary of the
early admissions market becomes common knowledge. In stage 3, the regu-
lar admissions market opens. Given the commitments of colleges in the early
admissions period, vacant slots of colleges are ﬁlled according to the regular
matching rule.
Since the third stage of the game involves no strategies to be played, we
proceed from stage 2 backwards to solve for a subgame perfect equilibrium of
the game. We ﬁrst show that given any proﬁle of early admissions plans, in
stage 2 of the described game each college ﬁnds it a weakly dominant strategy
to report its early quota being equal to its total capacity, its early preference
list as the restriction of its regular preference ordering on any collection of
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acceptable students that involve the top acceptable students within its ca-
pacity size, the set of rejected students consisting of all students that are not
acceptable with respect to its regular preference ordering, the set of outright
deferred students to be consisting of all the nonrejected student applicants
ranking outside its capacity size with respect to its regular preference order-
ing, and the set of early admissible students as simply the rest of the early
applicants (Theorem 1).
Our second result shows that given the described equilibrium strategy in
the second stage of the game, each college ﬁnds it a weakly dominant strategy
to choose early action program in the ﬁrst stage (Theorem 2).
Two related papers to ours are deﬁnitely by Konishi and U¨nver (2006)
and Mumcu and Saglam (2007), deserving a lengthy discussion. Konishi
and U¨nver (2006) model a game of capacity manipulation for hospital-intern
markets with a single decision period. They show that there may not be a
pure strategy equilibrium under hospital-optimal and intern-optimal stable
rules, and whenever a pure strategy equilibrium exists, every hospital weakly
prefers this equilibrium outcome to the outcome of any larger capacity proﬁle.
Konishi and U¨nver (2006) consider two restrictions on preferences to ensure
the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium. Under the ﬁrst restriction,
hospitals always prefer a larger set of acceptable interns to a smaller set.
Then, reporting the number of assigned interns is an equilibrium strategy if
the matching rule is hospital-optimal and reporting the actual capacity is a
weakly dominant strategy if the matching rule is intern-optimal. The second
restriction requires common preferences of one group of agents (hospitals or
interns) over the other group and guarantees that reporting the true capacity
is a weakly dominant strategy for each hospital.
Mumcu and Saglam (2007) study early admissions problem; however col-
leges, unlike in our model, do not play a game over early admissions pro-
grams. Their model, which borrows from the one-period game in Konishi
and U¨nver (2006), considers a two-period admissions market where all col-
leges have an early decision program and play a noncooperative game of the
intertemporal allocation of the total capacity. Under college-optimal and
student-optimal matching systems, they show that there may not be a pure
strategy equilibrium. Therefore, Mumcu and Saglam (2007) restrict prefer-
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ences to ensure the existence of pure strategy equilibria. They prove that
when either colleges or students have common preferences over the other set
of agents, ‘terminating early decision program’ becomes a weakly dominant
strategy for each college if every student, choosing to act early, applies to his
or her top choice college irrespective of the early decision quotas of colleges.
We should immediately notice that the partial result of Mumcu and Saglam
(2007) to eliminate early decision is checked by our second theorem to be
robust with respect to the presence of colleges in the market oﬀering early
action programs and with respect to the less restrictive preferences of colleges
and students. However, our result clearly conveys more: a two-period college
admissions involving early action, as the additional plan we consider in our
paper, is weakly dominating, for colleges, the one-period regular admissions,
as well.
The organization of the paper is as follows: Section 2 introduces the
model. Section 3 presents our results and Section 4 concludes.
2 Model
2.1 Basic Structures
2.1.1 Matching Environment
A matching environment is denoted by the list (C, S, q, R) that involves the
following ﬁxed components:
Market Participants: The ﬁrst two components of a matching environment
are non-empty, ﬁnite and disjoint sets of colleges C = c1, c2, ..., cm and stu-
dents S = s1, s2, ..., sn.
Total Capacities of Colleges: The third component is a vector of positive
natural numbers q = (qc1 , ..., qcm), where qc is the total capacity of college c.
Preferences: The last component of a matching environment is a list of pref-
erence relations R = (Rc1, ..., Rcm ,Rs1, ..., Rsn) where Rc is the preference
relation of college c and Rs is the preference relation of student s.
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For any c ∈ C, Rc is a binary preference relation that is a linear order
on Σc = 2
S. Similarly, for any s ∈ S, Rs is a binary relation that is a
linear order on Σs = {{c1}, {c2}, ....{cm}, ∅}. The element ∅ is interpreted
by both colleges and students as the prospect of being unassigned. Let Rc
and Rs respectively denote the class of all preference relations for college
c ∈ C and for student s ∈ S. Deﬁne also R = ×k∈C∪SRk. Let Pk denote the
strict preference relation associated with the preference relation Rk for agent
k ∈ C ∪ S. We say that an element y ∈ Σx is acceptable to agent x ∈ C ∪ S
if y Px {∅}.
The preference relation Rc of college c ∈ C is said to be responsive (Roth,
1985) whenever for all S ′ ⊂ S it is true that
i) for all s ∈ S\S ′, S ′ ∪ {s}Pc S
′ if and only if {s}Pc ∅,
ii) for all s, s′ ∈ S\S ′, S ′ ∪ {s}Pc S
′ ∪ {s′} if and only if {s}Pc{s
′}.
(Notice that preferences of students over the individual colleges are triv-
ially responsive.)
Let F denote the set of all matching environments. For the rest of the
model, we ﬁx the matching environment at F = (C, S, q, R).
2.1.2 Early Admissions Market
An early admissions market is a list (α, qEC (α),Σ
E
C(α),Σ
E
S (α),Π
E
C(α)) with its
components deﬁned as follows:
College Admissions Plans: The ﬁrst component is a vector of college admis-
sions plans α = (αc1, ..., αcm), where for all c we have αc ∈ {a, d}, with a
and d respectively denoting ‘(multiple-choice) early action plan’ and ‘early
decision plan’ to be implemented in the early admissions period.
Early Quotas of Colleges: The second component is a vector of nonnegative
natural numbers qEC (α) = (q
E
c1
(α), ..., qEcm(α)), where q
E
c (α) ∈ {0, 1, ..., qc} is
the quota of college c in the early admissions period under the early admis-
sions proﬁle α. Deﬁne QEc (qc) = {0, 1, ..., qc} for all c ∈ C and Q
E(q) =
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×c∈C QEc (qc).
Early Lists of Colleges: The third component is a vector of lists ΣEC(α) =
(ΣEc1(α), ...,Σ
E
cm
(α)) where ΣEc (α) is the ordered list of collections of students,
each of which is considered as acceptable by college c in the early admissions
period under the proﬁle of early admissions plans α. Thus, we will assume
that ΣEc (α) ⊆ {T ∈ Σc : T Pc ∅} for all c and for all α ∈ {a, d}
m. We will
simply call ΣEC(α) as ‘early lists of colleges’ under the plan α.
Early Lists of Students: The fourth component is a vector of lists ΣES (α) =
(ΣEs1(α), ...,Σ
E
sn
(α)) where ΣEs (α) is the ordered list of colleges each of which
is considered as acceptable by student s in the early admissions period under
the proﬁle of early admissions plans α. We will simply call ΣES (α) as ‘early
lists of students’ under the plan α.
For any α ∈ {a, d}m, we will assume that ΣEs (α) ⊆ {c ∈ Σs : {c}Ps ∅}
such that |{c ∈ ΣEs : αc = d}| ≤ 1 for all s. Moreover, for all c ∈ C, for all
α−c ∈ {a, d}
m−1, and for all s ∈ S, we assume ΣEs ((a, α−c)) ⊇ Σ
E
s ((d, α−c)),
i.e., keeping the early admissions plans of all colleges except for the plan of
college c constant, the set of colleges that student s would apply when college
c oﬀers an early action plan includes the set of colleges that he or she would
apply when college c oﬀers an early decision plan.9
Pre-Matching Actions of Colleges in the Early Admissions Period: The last
component of an early admissions market summarizes the pre-matching ac-
tions of colleges. Given a list ΣES (α), we deﬁne the early applicant pool
for any college c by ΦEc (α) = {s ∈ S : c ∈ Σ
E
s (α)}. Let J
E
c (α) ⊆ Φ
E
c (α)
denote the set of students rejected by college c in early admissions. For
any college c, let the set of outright deferred students in the early ad-
missions be denoted by DEc (α) ⊆ Φ
E
c (α)\J
E
c (α). Then the resulting set
of early admissible students for college c is denoted by AEc (α) = Φ
E
c (α)\
(DEc (α)∪J
E
c (α)). Deﬁne a partition Π
E
c (α) = {J
E
c (α), D
E
c (α), A
E
c (α)} as the
9This assumption is consistent with the fact that any college offering an early deci-
sion plan cannot receive early application from any student who applies to another early
decision plan, since students cannot apply to more than one early decision plan.
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summary of the pre-matching actions of college c. Let JEC (α) = (J
E
c (α))c∈C,
DEC (α) = (D
E
c (α))c∈C , A
E
C(α) = (A
E
c (α))c∈C , and Π
E
C(α) = (Π
E
c (α))c∈C .
Let ZE denote the set of all possible early admissions markets. Denote
by ZEα,c the set of all possible lists (q
E
c (α),Σ
E
c (α),Π
E
c (α)). Deﬁne Z
E
α,C(i) =
×c∈CZEα,c(i) for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, Z
E
α,C = (Z
E
α,C(1),Z
E
α,C(2),Z
E
α,C(3)), and Z
E
α,−c =
ZE
α,C\{c}
. Also deﬁne the completion operator Γα : Z
E
α,C → Z
E , which will
be useful in Section 2.2., such that Γα(Z) = (α, Z(1), Z(2),ΣES (α), Z(3)) for
any Z ∈ ZEα,C , where Z(i) denotes the i th component of Z.
2.1.3 Early Admissions Matching Problem
Early Matchings: Given an early admissions market (α, qEC (α),Σ
E
C(α),Σ
E
S (α),
ΠEC(α)), a matching µ
E in the early admissions period is a function from the
set C ∪ S into 2C∪S such that:
i) |µE(s)| ≤ 1 and µE(s) ⊆ ΣEs (α) for all s ∈ S;
ii) |µE(c)| ≤ qEc (α) and µ
E(c) ⊆ ΣEc (α) for all c ∈ C;
iii) for all (c, s) ∈ C × S, µE(s) = {c} if and only if s ∈ µE(c).
We denote the set of all matchings for a given early admissions market
ZE ∈ ZE by ME(ZE). Let ME = ∪ZE∈ZEM
E(ZE).
We say that s prefers matching µE1 to matching µ
E
2 if and only if it prefers
µE1 (s) to µ
E
2 (s) under the preference relation Rs. We do the same for each
college.
Admissible Early Choices of Colleges: Given an early admissions market
ZE = (α, qEC (α),Σ
E
C(α),Σ
E
S (α),Π
E
C(α)), the admissible choice of a college c
from a group of students T ⊆ S in the early admissions market is deﬁned as
ChEc (T, Z
E) = {T ′ ⊆ T ∩AEc (α) : |T
′| ≤ qEc (α), T
′Rc T
′′
for all T
′′
⊆ T such that |T
′′
| ≤ qEc (α)}.
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Blocking Early Matchings: Given an early admissions marketZE = (α, qEC (α),
ΣEC(α),Σ
E
S (α),Π
E
C(α)), a matching µ
E ∈ ME(ZE) is blocked by college
c if µE(c) = ChEc (µ
E(c), ZE).10 A matching µE is blocked by a college-
student pair (c, s) if c ∈ ΣEs (α), s ∈ Σ
E
c (α), {c}Ps µ
E(s), and µE(c) =
ChEc (µ
E(c) ∪ {s}, ZE).
Stability of Early Matchings: A matching µE is stable if it is not blocked by
a student, a college, or a college-student pair. We denote by SE(ZE), the set
of stable matchings for the early admissions market ZE ∈ ZE . In this set,
there exists a matching, µEC(Z
E), called the college-optimal stable matching
in the early admissions period such that
µEC(Z
E)(c)Rc µ
E(c)
for all c ∈ C and for all µE ∈ SE(ZE).
Analogously, there is a student-optimal stable matching in the early ad-
missions period, µES (Z
E), that every student likes as well as any other stable
matching.
Early Matching Rules: A matching rule in the early admissions period is a
function ϕE : ZE → ME such that for all ZE ∈ ZE , we have ϕE(ZE) ∈
ME(ZE). Let ϕ¯E denote the set of all early matching rules.
Stability of Early Matching Rules: An early matching rule ϕE ∈ ϕ¯E is stable
if ϕE(ZE) ∈ SE(ZE) for all ZE ∈ ZE.
Ex-post Deferred Students in the Early Admissions Period: We assume that
any college c ∈ C defers in the early admissions period, in addition to its
outright deferred applicants, any admissible student with whom it is not
matched. That is, given an early admissions market (α, qEC (α),Σ
E
C(α),Σ
E
S (α),
ΠEC(α)), college c late defers all students in A
E
c (α)\µ
E(c). Let D˜Ec (α) =
DEc (α) ∪ A
E
c (α)\µ
E(c) denote the set of ex-post deferred students after the
10We do not need to define and check the usual individual blocking of students since by
definition µE(s)Rs {∅} for all s ∈ S.
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early admissions market is closed. Deﬁne D˜EC (α) = (D˜
E
c (α))c∈C. Also deﬁne
Π˜Ec (α) = {J
E
c (α), D˜
E
c (α), µ
E(c)} and Π˜EC(α) = (Π˜
E
c (α))c∈C .
Post-Matching Summary of Early Admissions Market: Given a pre-matching
early admissions market ZE ∈ ZE and a matching function µE ∈ ME(ZE),
let the vector ZEµE denote the corresponding post-matching early admissions
market such that ZEµE(i) = Z
E(i) for i = 5 and ZEµE(5) = Π˜
E
C(α), where
ZEµE(i) and Z
E(i) respectively denote the ith component of the vectors ZEµE
and ZE.
Post-Matching Early Admissions Status of Students: Given an early ad-
missions market ZE = (α, qEC (α),Σ
E
C(α),Σ
E
S (α),Π
E
C(α)), an early matching
µE ∈ME(ZE), deﬁne the status of student s at college c with respect to the
post-matching summary ZEµE of Z
E as
xEs,c(Z
E
µE) =


0 (not applied) if s /∈ Π˜EC(α),
1 (rejected) if s ∈ JEC (α),
2 (ex-post deferred) if s ∈ D˜EC (α),
3 (accepted) if s ∈ µE(c).
Let xEs (Z
E
µE) = (x
E
s,c(Z
E
µE))c∈C = (x
E
s,c(Z
E
µE), x
E
s,−c(Z
E
µE)) for any c ∈ C and
xES (Z
E
µE) = (x
E
s (Z
E
µE))s∈S = (x
E
s (Z
E
µE), x
E
−s(Z
E
µE)) for any s ∈ S.
2.1.4 Regular Admissions Market
Given an early admissions market ZE = (α, qEC (α),Σ
E
C(α),Σ
E
S (α),Π
E
C(α))
and an early matching µE ∈ ME(ZE), a regular admissions market is a list
ZR(ZE) = (ΣRC(Z
E
µE),Σ
R
S (x
E
S (Z
E
µE)),Π
R
C(Σ
R
S (x
E
S (Z
E
µE))) with its components
deﬁned as follows:
Regular Lists of Colleges: The ﬁrst component of a regular matching market
is a vector of lists ΣRC(Z
E
µE) = (Σ
R
c (Z
E
µE))c∈C , where Σ
R
c (Z
E
µE) is the ordered
list of collection of students each of which is considered as acceptable by col-
lege c in the regular admissions period. We assume that ΣEc (α) ⊆ Σ
R
c (Z
E
µE) ⊆
Σc for all c. We will simply call ΣRC(Z
E
µE) as ‘regular lists of colleges’.
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Regular Lists of Students: The second component of a regular matching mar-
ket is a vector of lists ΣRS (x
E
S (Z
E
µE)) = (Σ
R
s (x
E
S (Z
E
µE)))s∈S, where Σ
R
s (x
E
S (Z
E
µE))
is the ordered list of colleges each of which is considered as acceptable by
student s in the regular admissions period under the post-matching early
admissions status xES (Z
E
µE) of students. We will simply call Σ
R
S (x
E
S (Z
E
µE)) as
‘regular lists of students’.
We assume that ΣRS (x
E
S (Z
E
µE)) ⊆ {c ∈ Σs : {c}Ps ∅}. However, for any s
and any c such that xEs,c(Z
E
µE) = 1, we have c /∈ Σ
R
s (x
E
S (Z
E
µE)), i.e., no stu-
dent ever applies in the regular admissions period to a college that rejected
himself or herself in early admissions. For any s and any c such that αc = d
and xEs,c(Z
E
µE) = 3, we have Σ
R
s (x
E
S (Z
E
µE)) = ∅, i.e., a student who has been
accepted early to an early decision program does not make any regular appli-
cations. In addition, for any s and any c such that either xEs,c(Z
E
µE
) = 3 and
αc = a or xEs,c(Z
E
µE) = 2, we have c ∈ Σ
R
s (x
E
S (Z
E
µE)) if and only if there exists
no c′ such that xEs,c′(Z
E
µE) = 3 and {c
′}Ps {c}, i.e., a student always applies
in regular admissions to an early action college that gave ex-post deferral or
acceptance as well as to an early decision college that gave ex-post deferral,
provided there exists no other college that gave early acceptance to this stu-
dent and is strictly preferred by the student. Moreover, we assume that the
set of colleges a student s applies in regular admissions when he or she was
ex-post deferred by a college c in early admissions involves all the colleges
that he or she would apply when he or she was accepted early by college c
plus a subset of the colleges that are less preferred than c and more preferred
than ∅, keeping constant the early status of this student at all other colleges.
This last assumption will be called precautiosness of students.
Pre-Matching Actions of Colleges in the Regular Admissions Period: Given
the regular applicant pool ΦRc (Z
E
µE) = {s ∈ S : c ∈ Σ
R
s (x
E
S (Z
E
µE)))} of col-
lege c, we simply assume that in the regular admissions period the set of
outright rejected students by college c is JRc (Z
E
µE) = Φ
R
c (Z
E
µE)\Σ
R
c (Z
E
µE) for
each college c. We then denote by ARc (Z
E
µE) = Φ
R
c (Z
E
µE) ∩ Σ
R
c (Z
E
µE) the set
of admissible students for college c in the regular admissions period. Let
ΠRc (Z
E
µE) = {J
R
c (Z
E
µE), A
R
c (Z
E
µE)}. Also deﬁne J
R
C (Z
E
µE) = (J
R
c (Z
E
µE))c∈C,
ARC(Z
E
µE) = (A
R
c (Z
E
µE))c∈C, and Π
R
C(Z
E
µE) = (Π
R
c (Z
E
µE))c∈C.
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Let ZR(ZEµE) denote the set of all regular admissions markets given the
post-matching summary ZEµE of the early admissions market Z
E . Deﬁne
ZR = ∪ZE∈ZE ∪µE∈ME(ZE) Z
R(ZEµE).
2.1.5 Regular Admissions Matching Problem
Regular Matchings: Given a regular admissions market (ΣRC(Z
E
µE),Σ
R
S (x
E
S (
ZEµE)),Π
R
C(Z
E
µE)) deﬁned at Z
E
µE , we deﬁne a matching µ
R in the regular
admissions period as a function from the set C ∪ S into 2C∪S such that:
i) |µR(s)| ≤ 1 and µR(s) ⊆ ΣRs (x
E
S (Z
E
µE)) for all s ∈ S, and µ
R(s) = µE(s)
for any s ∈ S such that αµE(s) = d;
ii) |µR(c)| ≤ qc and µ
R(c) ⊆ ΣRc (Z
E
µE) for all c ∈ C, and µ
R(c) ⊇ µE(c)
for any c ∈ C such that αc = d;
iii) for all (c, s) ∈ C × S, µR(s) = {c} if and only if s ∈ µR(c).
We notice that the function µR preserves the early admissions matchings
under µE of each college oﬀering an early decision plan. Here, we denote
the set of all matchings in the regular admissions period for a given regular
admissions matching problem ZR(ZEµE) ∈ Z
R(ZEµE) by M
R(ZR(ZEµE)) and
the set of all such matchings in the regular admissions period by MR(ZEµE).
We also deﬁne MR = ∪ZE∈ZE ∪µE∈ME(ZE) M
R(ZEµE).
We say that s prefers matching µR1 to matching µ
R
2 in the regular ad-
missions period if and only if s prefers µR1 (s) to µ
R
2 (s) under the preference
relation Rs. We do the same for each college.
Admissible Regular Choices of Colleges: Given a post-matching early admis-
sions market ZEµE and a regular admissions market Z
R(ZEµE) = (Σ
R
C(Z
E
µE),
ΣRS (x
E
S (Z
E
µE)),Π
R
C(Z
E
µE)), the admissible regular choice of a college c from
a group of students T available for assignment satisfying T ⊆ S\µE(c), is
deﬁned as
ChRc (T, Z
R(ZEµE)) = {T
′ ⊆ T ∩ARc (Z
E
µE) : |T
′| ≤ qc − |µ
E(c)|,
T ′ ∪ µE(c)Rc T
′′
∪ µE(c) for all T
′′
⊆ T
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such that |T
′′
| ≤ qc − |µ
E(c)|}.
Note that irrespective of the type of its early admissions plan, the admissible
choice of every college in the regular admissions period always selects from a
set that excludes the students to which the college early committed itself.
Blocking Regular Matchings: Given a post-matching early admissions market
ZEµE and a regular admissions market Z
R(ZEµE) = (Σ
R
C(Z
E
µE),Σ
R
S (x
E
S (Z
E
µE)),
ΠRC(Z
E
µE)), a regular admissions matching µ
R preserves the matches between
students and colleges oﬀering early decision plan, i.e., µR(s) = µE(s) for any
s such that µE(s) ∈ C and αµE(s) = d. In fact, only those students who are
in the early admissions period assigned to a college oﬀering early action plan
can block a regular admissions matching.11 That is, a matching µR is blocked
in the regular admissions period by any student s such that µE(s)Ps µ
R(s)
only if αµE(s) = a. A matching µ
R is blocked by college c in the regular admis-
sions period if µR(c)\µE(c) = ChRc (µ
R(c)\µE(c), ZR(ZEµE)). A matching µ
R
is blocked in the regular admissions period by a college-student pair (c, s) sat-
isfying either µE(s) = ∅ or else αµE(s) = a if c ∈ Σ
R
s (x
E
S (Z
E
µE)), s ∈ Σ
R
c (Z
E
µE),
{c}Ps µ
R(s), and µR(c)\µE(c) = ChRc ({s} ∪ µ
R(c)\µE(c), ZR(ZEµE)).
Stability of Regular Matchings: A matching µR is stable if it is not blocked by
a student, a college, or a college-student pair. We denote by SR(ZR(ZEµE)),
the set of stable matchings for the regular admissions matching problem
ZR(ZEµE) ∈ Z
R(ZEµE). In this set, there exists a matching µ
R
C(Z
R(ZEµE)),
called the college-optimal stable matching in the regular admissions period,
such that
µRC(Z
R(ZEµE))(c)Rc µ
R(c)
for all c ∈ C and for all µR ∈ SR(ZR(ZEµE)).
Analogously, there is a student-optimal stable matching in the regular ad-
missions period, µRS (Z
R(ZEµE)), that every student likes as well as any other
stable matching.12
11We do not need to check the individual blocking of students unassigned to any college
in early admissions since by definition µR(s)Rs {∅} for all s ∈ S.
12To find the college-optimal and student-optimal stable matchings in the two admis-
sions periods, we respectively use the well-known college-proposing and student-proposing
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Regular Matching Rules: A matching rule in the regular admissions pe-
riod is a function ϕR : ZR → MR such that for all ZR ∈ ZR, we have
ϕR(ZR) ∈ MR(ZR). Let ϕ¯R denote the set of all such regular matching
rules.
Stability of Regular Matching Rules: A regular matching rule ϕR ∈ ϕ¯R is sta-
ble at an early matching rule ϕE ∈ ϕ¯E if ϕR(ZR(ZEϕE(ZE))) ∈ S
R(ZR(ZEϕE(ZE)))
for all ZE ∈ ZE and for all ZR(ZEϕE(ZE)) ∈ Z
R(ZEϕE(ZE)).
2.1.6 Matching Systems
For any ϕE ∈ ϕ¯E that is used in the early admissions period and for any
ϕR ∈ ϕ¯R that is used in the regular admissions period, the ordered pair
(ϕE , ϕR) is called a matching system. Let ϕ denote the matching system
(ϕE , ϕR).
Stability of Matching Systems: A matching system ϕ is stable if (i) ϕE is
stable, and (ii) ϕR is stable at ϕE.
Let ϕC be such that ϕ
E
C(Z
E) = µEC(Z
E) and ϕRC(Z
R(ZE
ϕE
C
(ZE)
)) = µRC(Z
R(
ZE
µE
C
)), for all ZE ∈ ZE and ZR(ZE
ϕE
C
(ZE)) ∈ ZR(ZE
ϕE
C
(ZE)
). We call ϕC as the
college-optimal stable matching system.
Similarly, let ϕS be such that ϕ
E
S (Z
E) = µES (Z
E) and ϕRS (Z
R(ZE
ϕE
S
(ZE)
)) =
µRS (Z
R(ZE
µE
S
)), for all ZE ∈ ZE and ZR(ZE
ϕE
S
(ZE)
) ∈ ZR(ZE
ϕE
S
(ZE)
). We call ϕS
as the student-optimal stable matching system.
2.2 Early Admissions Game
We consider a matching environment F = (C, S, q, R) with |C| ≥ 2 for the
game to be nontrivial. We assume that the environment F and the match-
ing system ϕ are common knowledge. We also assume that colleges com-
pletely know students’ early lists ΣES (α) for each possible announcement of
the early admissions plans α ∈ {a, d}m as well as the regular admissions mar-
deferred acceptance algorithms by Gale and Shapley (1962).
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ket ZR(ZEϕE(ZE)) for each possible realization of the early admissions market
ZE ∈ ZE. The game consists of three consecutive stages:
Stage 1: Colleges simultaneously choose one of the two early admissions
plans, namely early action and early decision, to be implemented in the sec-
ond stage of the game. Once a proﬁle α ∈ {a, d}m is determined, it becomes
common knowledge in the rest of the game.
Stage 2: An early admissions market opens at the beginning of the second
stage of the game. Observing the proﬁle α and the corresponding vector
ΣES (α), each college c simultaneously chooses its early list Σ
E
c (α), its early
quota qEc (α), and its pre-matching partition Π
E
c (α). Given the early ad-
missions market ZE(α) = (α, qEC (α),Σ
E
C(α),Σ
E
S (α),Π
E
C(α)), the early match-
ing rule ϕE speciﬁes for each college the list of students to accept early
within its early admissions quota. Consequently, the post-matching summary
ZE(α)ϕE(ZE(α)) of the early admissions market becomes common knowledge.
Stage 3: The regular admissions market ZR(ZE(α)ϕE(ZE(α))) opens at the
beginning of the third stage of the game. Given the commitments of colleges
in the early admissons period, vacant slots of colleges are ﬁlled according to
the matching rule ϕR.
Above, we have described a multiple stage game with observable actions.
Clearly, the third stage of the game involves no strategies to be played. Thus,
in order to solve for a subgame perfect equilibrium of the game, we proceed
from stage 2 backwards.
For a given proﬁle α and a matching system ϕ, college c’s preferences in
stage 2 (S2) over the reports of early lists, early admissions quotas and pre-
matching actions of colleges are represented by a binary relationship ϕ,S2c
over the set ZEα,C such that for all Z,Z
′ ∈ ZEα,C we have
Zϕ,S2c Z
′ if and only if ϕR(ZR(Γα(Z)ϕE(Γα(Z))))Rc ϕ
R(ZR(Γα(Z
′)ϕE(Γα(Z′)))).
Deﬁne college c’s best response correspondence in stage 2 under the
matching system ϕ by βϕ,S2c : Z
E
α,−c → Z
E
α,c such that for any Z−c ∈ Z
E
α,−c,
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we have
βϕ,S2c (Z−c) = {Z
′
c ∈ Z
E
α,c : (Z
′
c, Z−c)
ϕ,S2
c (Z
′′
c , Z−c) for all Z
′′
c ∈ Z
E
α,c}.
Given any α ∈ {a, d}m, a pure strategy (Nash) equilibrium of stage 2
game is a strategy proﬁle Zˆ(α) ∈ ZEα,C such that Zˆc(α) ∈ β
ϕ,S2
c (Zˆ−c(α)) for
all c ∈ C.
Assume that for each α ∈ {a, d}m, the set of equilibrium strategy proﬁles
of stage 2 game is always nonempty and each member of this set leads to the
same matching outcome ϕE(Γα(Zˆ(α))).13 Then going backwards to stage 1
of the reduced game, we represent college c’s preferences in stage 1 (S1) over
the early admissions plans by a binary relationship ϕ,S1c over {a, d}
m such
that for all α′, α′′ ∈ {a, d}m we have α′ϕ,S1c α
′′ if and only if
ϕR(ZR(Γα′(Zˆ(α
′))ϕE(Γα′(Zˆ(α′))))) Rc ϕ
R(ZR(Γα′′(Zˆ(α
′′))ϕE(Γα′′(Zˆ(α′′))))).
Deﬁne college c’s best response correspondence in stage 1 under the
matching system ϕ by βϕ,S1c : {a, d}
m−1 → {a, d} such that for any α−c ∈
{a, d}m−1, we have
βϕ,S1c (α−c) = {α
′
c ∈ {a, d} : (α
′
c, α−c)
ϕ,S1
c (α
′′
c, α−c) for all α
′′
c ∈ {a, d}}.
Given the Nash play in stage 2 game, a pure strategy (Nash) equilibrium
of stage 1 game is a strategy proﬁle α ∈ {a, d}m such that αc ∈ β
ϕ,S1
c (α−c)
for all c ∈ C.
Apparently, the list (αˆ, qˆEC (αˆ), Σˆ
E
C(αˆ), Πˆ
E
C(αˆ)) constitutes a pure strategy
subgame perfect equilibrium of the two-period college admissions game, if
the list (qˆEC (αˆ), Σˆ
E
C(αˆ), Πˆ
E
C(αˆ)) is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of stage
2 game and the proﬁle αˆ is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the reduced
game in stage 1.
We now introduce the following deﬁnition that will be useful in the next
section while characterizing the equilibria of the described game.
For any ﬁnite set X, any linear order R˜ deﬁned over X, and any positive
integer l ≤ |X |, denote by Top(X; l) the top lth-ranked element of X under
R˜.
13We will check that this is indeed the case in the essentially unique equilibrium of the
game.
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3 Results
We will below show that given any proﬁle of early admissions plans, it is a
weakly dominant strategy for each college to report in the second stage of the
described game its early quota as its total capacity, its early preference list as
the restriction of its regular preference ordering on any collection of accept-
able students involving the top acceptable students within its capacity size,
the set of rejected students consisting of all students that are not acceptable
with respect to its regular preference ordering, the set of outright deferred
students to be consisting of all the nonrejected student applicants ranking
outside its capacity size with respect to its regular preference ordering, and
the set of early admissible students as simply the rest of the early applicants.
Theorem 1. For any α ∈ {a, d}m, the list qEc (α) = qc, Σ
E
c (α) ⊇ {s ∈ S :
Top(Σc; ρ) = s for some ρ ∈ Q
E
c (qc) and {s}Ps ∅}, Jc(α) = {s ∈ Φ
E
c (α) :
∅Pc {s}}, Dc(α) = {s ∈ Φ
E
c (α)\Jc(α) : s = Top(Σ
E
c (α), ρ) for ρ > qc}, and
Ac(α) = Φ
E
c (α)\(D
E
c (α)∪ J
E
c (α)) constitutes a weakly dominant strategy for
each college c in stage 2 of the college admissions game.
Proof. Consider any α ∈ {a, d}m, qE(α) ∈ QE(q), ΣEc (α) ⊂ {T ∈ Σc :
T Pc ∅} for all c ∈ C, Jc(α) ⊆ Φc(α) for all c ∈ C. We will ﬁrst show that
Dc(α) = {s ∈ Φc(α)\Jc(α) : s = Top(Σ
E
c (α), ρ) for ρ > qc} is weakly domi-
ant strategy for all c ∈ C such that αc = a. The reason is that by deferring
a student s instead of accepting him or her early, a college c can get rid of
its unilateral commitment, hence from the risk of ﬁlling early a slot in its
total capacity with a student that may be inferior to a regular applicant.
However, if student s is in the list of the most preferred qc students of college
c, deferring and accepting are apparently equivalent in terms of the match-
ing outcome they would induce. (Note that by precautiousness of students
in regular admissions, the set of colleges that are preferred by s to college
c in the regular admissions period are the same, so that by deferring stu-
dent s college c cannot become worse oﬀ than in the case it accepts s early.)
The same conclusions also carry over to the case in which αc = d, since a
student can apply to only one college oﬀering early decision plan. Then, it
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follows that Jc(α) = {s ∈ Φc(α) : ∅Pc {s}} is a weakly dominant strategy
for college c ∈ C for all α ∈ {a, d}m. Ac(α) follows by deﬁnition. Then
ΣEc (α) ⊇ {s ∈ S : Top(Σc;ρ) = s for some ρ ∈ Q
E
c (qc) and {s}Ps ∅} is a
weakly dominant strategy for each college c ∈ C.
Although the early preference list of any college in the characterized equi-
librium of stage 2 game is not uniquely given, the equilibrium is essentially
unique, since the set of early admissible students and hence the matching
outcome for a given early matching rule are uniquely characterized. Thus,
we can now move backwards to stage 1 and ﬁnd the admissions plans of col-
leges in equilibrium. The below theorem shows that given the equilibrium
strategies in stage 2, the choice of early action plan in stage 1 is a weakly
dominant strategy for each college whenever each student applies to an early
decision college only if it is the top college in his or her early list and weakly
preferred to the top college in his or her regular list.
Theorem 2. Consider the list (α, ZC(α)) such that for all c, αc = a, Zc(α) =
(qEc (α),Σ
E
c (α),Πc(α)), where q
E
c (α) = qc, Σ
E
c (α) ⊇ {s ∈ S : Top(Σc; ρ) =
s for some ρ ∈ QEc (qc) and {s}Ps ∅}, and Πc(α) = {Jc(α), Dc(α), Ac(α)}
with Jc(α) = {s ∈ ΦEc (α) : ∅Pc {s}}, Dc(α) = {s ∈ Φ
E
c (α)\Jc(α) : s =
Top(ΣEc (α), ρ) for ρ > qc}, and Ac(α) = Φ
E
c (α)\ (D
E
c (α) ∪ J
E
c (α)). The list
(αc, Zc(α)) constitutes a weakly dominant strategy for each college c in the
college admissions game if for any s ∈ S there exists a college c′ ∈ ΣEs (α) such
that αc′ = d only if c′ = Top(ΣEs (α); 1) and Top(Σ
E
s (α); 1)Rs Top(Σ
R
s (x
E
S (Γα(
ZC(α))ϕE(Γα(ZC(α))))); 1).
Proof. In the proof of Theorem 1, we have shown that qEc (α) = qc, Σ
E
c (α) ⊇
{s ∈ S : Top(Σc; ρ) = s for some ρ ∈ QEc (qc) and {s}Ps ∅}, Jc(α) =
{s ∈ ΦEc (α) : ∅Pc {s}}, Dc(α) = {s ∈ Φ
E
c (α)\Jc(α) : s = Top(Σ
E
c (α), ρ)
for ρ > qc}, and Ac(α) = Φ
E
c (α)\ (D
E
c (α) ∪ J
E
c (α)) constitute for each col-
lege c a weakly dominant strategy in stage 2 of the college admissions game.
Deﬁne Zc(α) = (q
E
c (α),Σ
E
c (α),Πc(α)), where Πc(α) = {Jc(α), Dc(α), Ac(α)}.
Given the associated early admissions market Γα(ZC(α)), the strategy αc = a
weakly dominates the strategy αc = d for each college c. This is because of
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the assumption that for all c ∈ C, for all α−c ∈ {a, d}m−1, and for all s ∈ S,
c ∈ ΣEs ((d, α−c)) implies c ∈ Σ
E
s ((a, α−c)). Hence, if s ∈ ϕ
E(Γα(ZC(d, α−c))),
then s ∈ ϕE(Γα(ZC(a, α−c))). On the other hand, for all c ∈ C, for all
α−c ∈ {a, d}m−1, and for all s ∈ S if c /∈ ΣEs ((d, α−c) then either there exists
c′ ∈ ΣEs ((d, α−c)) such that αc′ = d or the student s is not applying to any
college oﬀering an early decision plan. In both cases by setting αc = a college
c is never worse oﬀ; indeed it may even entice the student s to apply early to
itself in case he or she also applies to a higher ranked college with an early
decision plan.
The (weak) superiority of early action plan for each college to early deci-
sion plan is in line with the earlier result of Mumcu and Saglam (2007) in a
simpler two-period admissions model with early decision showing that it is a
weakly dominant strategy for each college to terminate its early decision pro-
gram if every student, choosing to act early, always applies early to his or her
top choice college. However, we also establish in this study the (weak) supe-
riority of two-period admissions with early action to single-period (regular)
admissions.
We should here notice that early action and early decision programs can
coexist in equilibrium if we relax the assumption that each student applies to
an early decision college only if it is the top college in his or her early list and
weakly preferred to the top college in his or her regular list. For example,
consider a matching environment involving a very popular early action col-
lege, c1, in regular admissions that however receives early applications from
moderately ranked students, a relatively less popular early decision college,
c2, in regular admissions that receives early applications of very high ranked
students, and the least popular college, c3, in regular admissions that re-
ceives early applications from high, medium, and low ranked students. One
can easily ﬁll in the remaining details of the matching environment to en-
sure that the given early admissions plans are in equilibrium since c1 prefers
early action to early decision not to tie itself to some moderate students in
early admissions, college c2 oppositely prefers early decision to early action
in order to secure for itself early admittances of some compromising, high
ranked students, and ﬁnally college c3, observing the strategy of college c2,
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prefers early action to early decision not to lose early applications from some
compromising, high and medium ranked students.
4 Conclusions
We have studied some strategic aspects of the early admissions problem faced
by colleges in the United States using a two-period matching game with
observable actions. Our ﬁrst result shows that irrespective from the early
admissions plans in the matching market, it is a weakly dominant strategy
for each college to choose (i) its early quota as its total capacity, (ii) its
early preference list as any collection of acceptable students involving the
top acceptable students within its capacity, (iii) the set of rejected students
to be consisting of all unacceptable students, (iv) the set of outright deferred
students to be consisting of all the nonrejected applicants ranking outside its
capacity size, (v) the set of early admissible students as the rest of the early
applicants, and (vi) the set of ex-post deferrals (by assumption) as the union
of the set of outright deferred students and the set of all early admissible
students with whom it was not matched in the early admissions period.
The validity of our ‘quite inclusive’ equilibrium strategy of deferral, which
we also ﬁnd to be independent of the proﬁle of early admissions plans, is ver-
iﬁed by the report of Avery et.al. (2003, pp. 188-189) that “...historically
most colleges rejected 5 percent or fewer of their early applicants in Decem-
ber. Some, such as Cornell, Georgetown, MIT, and Tufts, have automatically
deferred to the regular pool all early applicants who are not admitted in De-
cember”.
Our second result states that for each college early action plan is weakly
dominating early decision plan whenever each student in the market applies
to an early decision college only if it is the top college in his or her early
list and weakly preferred to the top college in his or her regular list. The
early application strategy driving our second result is strongly recommended
for all students by the College Board, counsellars, college admission oﬃcers,
and many college guides. Indeed, this recommendation might have been
highly welcome by students and their families, as a survey reported in Avery
et.al (2003, p. 205) reveals that 98 percent of a total of 48 sample students
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applied during 1997-2000 to an early decision program as a strong or weak
ﬁrst choice. It is quite interesting that a common recommendation solely
made for the better functioning of early decision plans can in eﬀect lead to
the complete elimination of these plans in equilibrium, as also remarked by
Mumcu and Saglam (2007).
Looking from an entirely diﬀerent angle, Avery et.al. (2003, pp. 267-
268) highlights a major concern, for students and their families, about early
admissions pertaining only to early decision as follows:
“Because Early Decision is binding, it prevents applicants from gath-
ering more information during their senior year, and possibly changing
their minds. It also prevents financial aid applicants from seeing, much
less bargaining over, aid packages at other colleges. ... The simplest
way to address these concerns would be to abolish Early Decision
programs but allow Early Action to continue.”
Our results obtained under the strategic behavior of colleges in the in-
tertemporal allocation of their capacities may absolutely fortify the argu-
ments for ‘eliminating early decision and keeping early action’ as one of
possible reforms14 to the existing college admissions system in a period of
increasing abstention of colleges from early decision.15
However, as we have already remarked, the separate incentives of colleges
in implementing early action and early decision plans can coexist in equilib-
rium if we depart from the premises of our second theorem by allowing the
presence of risk averse students who compromise in early admissions.
Thus, we now have a better understanding that the correct choice as well
as the success of a reform to the college admissions system can only be accom-
plished by gathering information about the genuine preferences of students
and colleges and giving due consideration to their strategic incentives.
14Avery et.al. (2003, pp. 266-293) discusses in detail seven reforms to the existing
college early admissions system.
15Avery et.al. (2003, p. 272) remarks that “as of fall 2002, the efforts of Richard Levin,
the president of Yale, have helped to induce four colleges to switch from Early Decision
to Early Action and led others to question the value of their Early Decision programs as
well.”
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